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1. Introduction 
If deciding is akin to taking a leap, then deciding rationally is 
tantamount to ensuring that one leaps over as narrow a chasm of uncertainty 
as possible. One contemplates a range of possible actions, assigns weights and 
probabilities to each, and then calculates which is likely to best serve one’s 
elected ends. Such deliberation is often seen as the site of human freedom, but 
the binding power of rationality does seem to imply that deliberation is, in its 
own way, a deterministic process. After all, if one knows the starting 
preferences and circumstances of an agent, then, assuming that the agent is 
rational and that those preferences and circumstances don’t change, one 
should be in a position to predict what the agent will decide. However, given 
that an agent could conceivably confront equally attractive alternatives, it is an 
open question whether rational choice theory can ever eliminate 
indeterminacy—fully bridging the chasm, as it were. 
The clearest support for such a limitation of rationality comes from 
the “Buridan’s ass” scenario, where an agent is confronted with two (or more) 
equally attractive/unattractive options. The famished ass stuck between 
equidistant bales of hay is of two minds on the matter. Its eventual action, if 
any, will of course attest to a singular commitment. But, it seems there must 
be a prior bottleneck, and it is what transpires in this anteroom of agency that 
is disputed. 
 “Choice” can be defined as something that “presupposes alternatives 
plus a requirement that an outcome be reached in favor of one of them to the 
exclusion of the other.”1 Call this last clause the univocity assumption. This 
assumption reveals some common methodological aspirations. Indeed, “the 
explanatory ideal in science is always to form hypotheses from which a 
unique observational consequence can be deduced.”2 Buridan’s ass cases 
compromise this desire always to churn out a univocal verdict. 
                                                          
1 James I. McAdam, “Choosing Flippantly or Non-Rational Choice,” Analysis 25, 
suppl. no. 3 (1965), p. 133. 
 
2 Jon Elster, “The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanations,” in Actions and 
Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest LePore and 
Brian P. McLaughlin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p. 65 (emphasis added). 
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Does rationality by itself have the resources needed to prevent 
paralysis of action? Differing answers to this question obviously entail 
differing research programs. One view asks us to note that rational agents are 
endowed with a power to “just do it,”3 while the other view asks us to collect 
still finer empirical details about situated exercises of rational agency. If, 
however, there can remain genuine leeway in the choices of even the most 
rational agents, this would undermine the prospect of predicting and/or 
guiding decision-making processes in a totally gap-free way. A modicum of 
voluntarism must, it seems, always be in the mix. 
As we shall see, those who (implicitly or explicitly) adhere to the 
univocity assumption cannot accept the decisional impotence one finds in 
Buridan’s ass cases, and so devise ways to avoid it. I will catalogue common 
responses and argue that each are either unwarranted or flawed. Obviously, 
the philosophical criticisms I will articulate need not challenge the specifics of 
decision theory—though they might pose a cap on its range of application. My 
presentation will follow a straightforward structure: I will first pinpoint the 
problem that concerns me, and will then examine four untenable responses to 
it. 
 
2. The Problem 
 In this article, I want to focus solely on what is essential. Mark 
Balaguer, for instance, distinguishes Buridan’s ass scenarios from “torn” 
decisions.
4
 The former involve qualitatively identical but numerically distinct 
options (e.g., two soup cans of the same brand), whereas the latter involve 
qualitatively different and numerically distinct options (e.g., a soup can versus 
a banana). One can certainly make this distinction. However, doing so is 
needless, since the assignment of an abstract valence like “utility” is, by 
design, general enough to subsume such features. Hence, it makes no 
difference what one is stuck between, provided one desires each equally. We 
simply have to play with the variables until they truly even out, at which point 
the discussion begins (though to foster clarity, I will nevertheless use 
qualitatively identical options as my examples). 
 If we disregard the fact that it involves a non-human animal, the 
problem of “Buridan’s ass” poses no great difficulty for the imagination (at 
least not obviously so). The “weights” that are balanced are not physical 
weights, but preferential weights. Hence, a trace element of physical matter 
added to or withdrawn from a given option does not automatically translate 
                                                                                                                              
 
3 See Marc Champagne, “Just Do It: Schopenhauer and Peirce on the Immediacy of 
Agency,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 18, no. 2 (Fall 
2014), pp. 209-32. 
 
4 Mark Balaguer, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2010), pp. 72–73. 
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into an increase or decrease in the utility assigned to that option. Moreover, no 
controversial (say, supernatural) elements are posited. In fact, some theorists 
like Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sydney Morgenbesser hold that cases of 
symmetrical preference abound, and propose that “[s]uper-market shelves 
supply us with paradigmatic examples of social picking situations proper.”5 
Of course, a lot of money is spent by firms for “featuring” their products by 
placing them in more conspicuous spots. Nevertheless, it does not offend the 
laws of physics one bit to think that two soup cans (on whatever shelf) might 
be equidistant from a customer. To the extent that this is correct, Buridan’s 
story might be a ubiquitous part of our daily lives, and we should be 
intimately familiar with our decisions in such cases. 
 Rational animals would be at a severe disadvantage if they had not 
evolved ways of wriggling out of decisional paralysis (otherwise their species-
specific differentia would be a considerable hindrance). Can we proceed from 
this to the conclusion that human agents are endowed with a faculty or power 
that escapes the net of traditional decision matrices? Ullmann-Margalit and 
Morgenbesser introduce the terms “picking” and “choosing” to describe 
decisions made in symmetrical and asymmetrical preferential contexts, 
respectively. “Picking” is non-monotonic, in the sense that one cannot deduce 
on the basis of an agent’s prior commitments and context what the outcome of 
her rational deliberations will be. Hence, when it comes to picking, the use of 
the adjective “rational” is moot. 
 Positing the existence of a faculty like picking would seem to be a 
perfectly respectable inference to the best explanation. Interestingly, before 
Buridan and his Latin peers discussed the matter, al-Ghazali had formulated 
the problem of preferential symmetry using a man stuck between two equally 
mouth-watering dates. Al-Ghazali concluded that “[e]veryone, therefore, who 
studies, in the human and the divine, the real working of the act of choice, 
must necessarily admit a quality the nature of which is to differentiate 
between two similar things.”6 More often than not, though, this line of 
abductive reasoning is not carried out, as a certain bias manifests itself. 
Philosophy as a distinctive activity is often said to rest on 
deliberation, so the suggestion that the ambit of those rational powers is 
limited can naturally be seen as tainting that disciplinary identity. Many 
philosophers thus assume that, given well-defined circumstances, a theory of 
rational choice can always tell us what to do. This assumption in turn fosters 
(or is fostered by?) a general confidence in the exhaustive power of reason. 
                                                          
5 Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sydney Morgenbesser, “Picking and Choosing,” Social 
Research 44, no. 4 (1977), p. 761. 
 
6 Quoted in Nicholas Rescher, “Choice without Preference: A Study of the History and 
of the Logic of the Problem of ‘Buridan’s Ass,’” Kant-Studien 51, no. 2 (1959–60), p. 
148. 
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There is a distinctively rationalist flavor to this belief. Rene Descartes, in his 
Fourth Meditation, offers a canonical statement: 
 
But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in 
one direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it 
is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect 
in knowledge or a kind of negation. For if I always saw clearly 
what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the 
right judgement or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly 
free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of 
indifference.
7
 
 
Pursuing that view, Benedict de Spinoza
8
 thought it would be flatly irrational 
for anyone to regard two options as truly equal, and Gottfried Leibniz
9
 
thought that decision without preference offends the (in his view, ubiquitous) 
principle of sufficient reason. Not everyone in the philosophical canon thinks 
that the principle of sufficient reason has exhaustive coverage, so some (like 
Arthur Schopenhauer
10
 and Jean-Paul Sartre
11
) would find no problem here. 
                                                          
7 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, trans. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), p. 40. For a similar view, see Brand Blanshard, Reason and 
Analysis (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1991), p. 493. 
 
8 Spinoza doubts whether a person frozen in equilibrium would still count as a person. 
The topic of balanced utilities, though motivated by formal considerations, thus 
becomes the province of “babies, fools, and madmen.” See Benedict de 
Spinoza, Complete Works, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), p. 
276. 
 
9 According to Leibniz, the scenario of Buridan’s ass is typical of the 
medieval “Schoolmen, whose ideas”—unlike, say, his windowless monads—“tend 
towards the chimerical.” Thanks to the activity of those Leibnizian monads, “small 
perceptions” (somehow) intervene to ensure that “[t]here is always a prevailing reason 
which prompts the will to its choice.” See Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E. M. 
Huggard (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1985), p. 148. As we are about to see in the 
following section, this is a prime example of response (c), which gratuitously posits 
subpersonal influences. 
 
10 For Schopenhauer, determinism applies to everything we perceive, but there is no 
reason to think that everything we perceive exhausts everything there is. See Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will, trans. Konstantin Kolenda (Mineola, 
NY: Dover, 2005). See also Champagne, “Just Do It: Schopenhauer and Peirce on the 
Immediacy of Agency.” 
 
11 For Sartre, consciousness always effaces itself before whatever intentional object it 
has. Since the conscious ego is nothing (literally, no thing), it cannot be subject to any 
law or causal force. To maintain otherwise would be to craft a cowardly excuse for 
one’s freely elected stance/attitude toward the world. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and 
Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 1 
141 
 
 
Still, theirs is a minority view, so the rationalist stance dominates, informing 
current debates.
12
 
 Of course, it is rare to find a theorist or philosopher openly affirming 
that rational decision knows no bounds. Nevertheless, when confronted with 
such limits, many write them off as merely apparent. Bruno de Finetti, for 
example, resorts mainly to (supposedly shared) intuitions to motivate his 
claims. He characterizes the idea that the world can house cases which have 
“no feature that would make one preferable to the other” as something that 
“puts nature in the terribly embarrassing situation of Buridan’s ass.”13 By 
parity of reasoning, one could just as easily say that strong dominance puts 
nature in the situation of making the choice for the agent. 
 
3. Four Untenable Responses 
 The world likely admits of a whole range of balances and 
imbalances, so it is difficult to see why one situation should be deemed more 
metaphysically absurd than the other. At any rate, the quick fixes encouraged 
by such a mindset are riddled with difficulties that are more significant than is 
typically assumed. I will now look at four common strategies. 
 
a. Postulating a neutral valence or state 
 We can begin with the least sophisticated response. Situations that 
appear problematic can be made less so by including “indifference” into the 
calculus. After all, since no recommendation can be inferred from indifference 
over and above the idea that both options are equally good and could both be 
picked, this seems like a perfectly sound analysis. 
 Alas, this response completely dodges the problem. Given that in the 
end an action will be taken, we have to explain why a specific option was 
privileged. Clearly, the idea of indifference cannot be of any help here; it is 
coined to express a state which may perhaps precede an action, but surely 
cannot prompt or accompany an action. Hence, it is legitimate to ask whether 
it was a utility or something else that put an end to the indifference. 
                                                                                                                              
Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Random House, 1994). This 
resembles the claim, “[i]n the Objectivist view, [that] no antecedent, deterministic 
factors can explain why people choose or do not choose to focus.” See Chris Matthew 
Sciabarra, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, 2d. ed. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2013), p. 153. For a comparative study of existentialist and 
objectivist views on free will and commitment, see Marc Champagne and Mimi Reisel 
Gladstein, “Beauvoir and Rand: Asphyxiating People, Having Sex, and Pursuing 
a Career,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (forthcoming). 
 
12 It could be argued that, by moving from a human to an ass, the Western tradition 
(re)cast the thought-experiment in terms that rhetorically poison the well. 
 
13 Bruno de Finetti, “Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on 
the Value of Science,” Erkenntnis 31, nos. 2–3 (1989), p. 178. 
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b. Tipping the utilities 
 If one endorses a twofold menu of utilities and indifference, then by 
virtue of a disjunctive syllogism, the observable absence of indifference 
licenses the inference of utilities. Another response therefore consists in 
doctoring a single optimum in re for each closed context and attributing all of 
the remaining rational indeterminacy to a straightforward lack of information 
on the part of the deciding agent. For de Finetti, equal cases are “only cases 
that differ in respects that are either unknown or causally unrelated to their 
happening.”14 Such unknown differences allow one to brush aside challenges 
to the univocity assumption.  
 The inherent shortcomings of measurements provide a ready asylum 
for the presumed impossibility of preferential symmetries, as many (or most) 
of the differences that could move an agent to prefer one option over another 
fall below a threshold of discernment. Given that minuscule differences in the 
weight of soup cans go undetected at point-of-purchase by a human ceteris 
paribus, one (fairly unsubtle) way to safeguard the univocity assumption is to 
interrupt a customer midway and inform her that the selection she was about 
to make is in point of fact less desirable, say, on account of its slightly lesser 
weight. However, not only would such an intervention doctor the situation in a 
question-begging way, it would violate the normal phenomenology of the 
event and thereby relinquish the claim that what is being modeled is the actual 
decision-making process of the agent(s). 
 The point can be stated in a methodological key. Regardless of one’s 
stance on the question of complete preferential symmetries, decision theory 
can hope to yield verdicts only if the alternatives, expected utilities, and 
predicted probabilities are kept finite and constant. All parties to the debate 
agree that the input data must at some point be frozen into place, at least for a 
given time-slice. To be sure, the social scientist or economist can always leave 
the observation booth, as it were, and actively intervene in the situation under 
scrutiny. Doing so, however, would contaminate the results on any gloss. So, 
while it can certainly be interesting to complicate an experimental design by 
allowing for a transparent feedback loop that permits agents to revise their 
forecast of a contingent future in the light of new third-person information 
about their conduct,
15
 the difficulty I am interested in is that which remains 
once all of these bells and whistles have been added. In other words, a 
supermarket customer can be informed of the weight of competing soup cans 
to as many decimal points as an experimenter wishes, but the relevant 
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 177. 
 
15 For an account of rational choice in the face of changing expected utilities, see 
Edward F. McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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situation emerges when the quantitative match is perfect or she simply stops 
caring, whichever comes first. 
 It could perhaps be replied on behalf of the interventionist strategy 
that, all other things being equal, an agent would want to know as many 
decimal points as possible. After all, charity recommends that we try to 
maximize the rationality of the agent whose antics we are interpreting.
16
 
According to what may be termed ideal conditions theory, “[i]f we have any 
reason to think that the agent is operating with partial or misleading 
information . . . then we should not take the choices that they make as 
revealing their ‘genuine’ preferences.”17 Isaac Levi expresses this same idea 
when he writes that “failure to live up to the commitment is excusable insofar 
as it is due to lack of memory and computational capacity or to emotional 
disturbance,” such that ascriptions of irrationality or incoherence “ought to be 
reserved for those who persist in violating logical closure even in the absence 
of such excuses.”18 Hence, on this view, if one happens to choose the lighter 
soup can, one is not “knowingly” going against the calculus of her utilities. 
The difficulty with this seemingly benign gloss, however, is that 
agents always operate with partial information and imperfect circumstances 
(as any philosophical skeptic will gladly demonstrate). This is problematic, 
since there is no standard by which to gauge when to halt the data-gathering. 
By searching for further facts, descriptive accounts of human decision can 
thus covertly partake in the intolerance of undecidability. 
 Faced with this, one might insist that “we should seek to narrow the 
gap between commitment and performance by improving the technologies 
which enhance our reasoning and computational capacities.”19 I agree that it is 
generally laudable to foster one’s rational skills. It is debatable, though, 
whether a lack of preference for two identical soup cans betokens a lapse in 
reason. To be sure, one can stipulate that preferential symmetries are to be 
taken as a sign to harvest more informational grist for the rational mill. Yet, 
“[g]iven a rule or a requirement, we can ask whether you ought to follow it, or 
whether you have a reason to do so.”20 Even if we accept for the sake of the 
argument that rationality is “a medal of honor bestowed upon certain decision 
makers by decision theorists,”21 it is not clear why an agent should receive 
                                                          
16 Dagfinn Føllesdal, “The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in 
the Explanation of Action,” Dialectica 36, no. 4 (1982), pp. 301–16. 
 
17 José Luis Bermúdez, Decision Theory and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 57. 
 
18 Isaac Levi, “Possibility and Probability,” Erkenntnis 31, nos. 2–3 (1989), p. 366. 
 
19 Ibid., p. 367. 
 
20 John Broome, “Is Rationality Normative?” Disputatio 2, no. 23 (2007), p. 162. 
 
21 Itzhak Gilboa, Rational Choice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), p. 6. 
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demerit points for being genuinely perplexed (and/or breaking with her 
symmetrical preferences “just because”). 
 
c. Positing sub-personal influences 
 Another way to protect univocity is to hold that the minute 
discrepancies of available options are not consciously accessible but 
nevertheless exert a “subliminal” force on agents. In essence, one can tip the 
utilities, unbeknownst to the decider. 
 Despite criticizing decision theory for being narrower in scope than 
typically assumed, Jon Elster succumbs to this strategy. There are many 
moments in Elster’s critique of standard accounts where the need for a novel 
non-rational element suggests itself, yet he opts to pursue explanations that do 
not challenge a stimulus-response model. He observes, for instance, that even 
when a situation is such as to present an agent with several equally weighed 
options that leave no room for rational choice, the agent will nonetheless 
retain the power “at least to ‘pick’ one of the options.”22 Since countenancing 
such a faculty has far-reaching implications, Elster effectively dodges the 
commitment by introducing more environmental factors like “perceptual 
salience or some other value-neutral feature of the situation [that] led to one 
option rather than another being ‘picked’.”23 In this way, sub-personal 
influences are posited in order to avoid the potentially unnerving implications 
of recognizing a different kind of decision-making power. 
 Such an appeal misunderstands Ullmann-Margalit and 
Morgenbesser’s original notions, insofar as Elster cannot add a “causal 
supplement” without adulterating “picking” and transforming it into a 
“choosing.” It is as if, upon noticing the plain fact that the ass in Buridan’s 
example will nevertheless choose one source of food, the philosopher 
uncomfortable with challenging determinist models of the mind would prefer 
invoking the time of day that bestowed on one sunlit bowl a perceptual 
salience, rather than positing some causa sui (“self-caused”) capacity. One 
can always add epicycles to save a theory. It is debatable, though, whether 
calling on situational minutia to break Buridan’s stalemate is more plausible 
than accepting a supplementary faculty like picking, which most subjects 
would likely report possessing.
24
 
 It could be argued that the very idea of unknown utilities is suspect 
or incoherent, because genuine agency requires an ability to give reasons for 
                                                                                                                              
 
22 Jon Elster, “The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanations,” in Actions and 
Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. LePore and 
McLaughlin, pp. 65–66. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 66. 
 
24 Balaguer, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, pp. 89-91. 
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what one does.
25
 Unless one wants to convert decisions into mere bodily 
happenings, unknown utilities cannot be unknowable utilities.
26
 In any event, 
the proponent of sub-personal influences is in need of an argument to show 
why and how something inaccessible to consciousness can nonetheless 
contribute to tilting the balance of an agent’s decision. Such a claim is 
notoriously difficult to establish (think of the many posits of Freudian 
psychoanalysis). 
This is not to deny the existence and causal efficacy of “subliminal” 
influences, for which there is undoubtedly experimental support. However, 
invoking the possible presence of such influences is a plausible strategy only 
in some situations. If injected into the situation of perfect balance that 
concerns me, it constitutes a change of topic. 
Those worried about manipulative marketers (or well-meaning 
“nudgers”) would do well to consider that, since the problem at hand is a 
general one, an agent could in principle be frozen before soup cans of the 
same brand, which would hardly be conducive to purchase. In other words, 
subliminal pulls could conceivably tug an agent evenly in opposing directions, 
jointly prompting incompatible courses of action with an equal degree of 
psychological force. 
 In a perfect preferential symmetry, the machinery of rationality is 
brought to a standstill because the set of options it confronts are deprived of 
any ordinality. In a bid to restore mock preferences, the subliminal retort 
posits a causal story but plunges it into murky waters, with the convenient 
assumption that there must be some account to be told in this regard—only 
we’ll never know it. I fail to see how this appeal is more epistemologically 
responsible or ontologically parsimonious than countenancing an ability 
simply to “pick” in a subset of cases. 
 
d. Bunching the options 
 We have now seen a variety of ways to protect the univocity 
assumption and explain away the troublesome prospect of confronting 
preferential symmetries. All of those responses have important flaws. Hence, 
instead of privileging analysis and increasing the pixellation to something 
more fine-grained, one could privilege synthesis and reduce the pixellation to 
something coarser-grained. Elster mentions that “one might redefine the 
choice situation by bunching the top-ranked alternatives into a single 
                                                          
25 See, for example, the cluster of views presented by Chauncey Maher in The 
Pittsburgh School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom (New York: Routledge, 
2012). 
 
26 Interestingly, when they address the topic of subliminal influences, Richard H. 
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein require that institutional “choice architects” be prepared to 
give (presumably persuasive) reasons for the selections they privilege. See their 
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 244–45. 
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option.”27 The idea, in sum, is that “If I am indifferent between a red umbrella 
and a blue umbrella, but prefer both to a raincoat, the choice becomes 
determinate once we have bunched the first two options as ‘an umbrella.’”28 
 Perhaps, but then this raises the following question: Why bunch these 
specifically? One might just as easily redefine the choice situation so that 
umbrellas and raincoats jointly become a single option, say, “Items that 
protect one from the rain.” For the bunching proposal to go through, one 
would need a principled criterion for why the discrimination of alternatives 
should be blurred at specific categorization boundaries and not others. It 
simply won’t do to say that the differently colored umbrellas are, as a class, 
preferred over the raincoat. The predicament is not that an agent stands before 
undifferentiated umbrellas and is plagued by (“akratic”) failure to act in 
accordance with her preference for them. Rather, the situation is 
philosophically interesting (and problematic) precisely because she fully 
notices the distinction in color yet nevertheless remains patently indifferent to 
it. 
 In a sense, the bunching strategy attempts to treat macroscopic 
differences as the equivalent of unnoticed differences. Minute differences are 
indeed bunched, but in such cases the preferential indifference stems from a 
straightforward cognitive ignorance. It is platitudinous to say that one does not 
care about the complementary class of things one knows nothing of.
29
 Hence, 
for the bunching strategy to succeed, it has to accord with the actual 
experiential situation of the agent, and therefore must acknowledge that the 
agent is indifferent with regard to two options, not one. Otherwise, one could 
just as well “bunch” a grocery store as a whole, since it is clearly preferred 
over starvation. Needless to say, that would not be very helpful. A rewrite into 
one “option” will thus remain ineffectual unless it can be shown to be more 
than merely ad hoc. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 Factually, paralysis of action is not a pervasive phenomenon. This is 
either because (i) the utilities one assigns to two or more options can never be 
balanced or because (ii) thanks to some non-rational faculty (say, the will), we 
would not be stuck even if those utilities were perfectly counterpoised. Having 
looked at four untenable responses, it becomes apparent that (i) is often just a 
dogma and (ii) is by no means a silly position. 
                                                          
27 Elster, “The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanations,” p. 66. 
 
28 Ibid. For an example of this maneuver, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “A Note on 
Preference and Indifference in Economic Analysis,” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics 8, no. 4 (2005), pp. 90–91. 
 
29 See the discussion of neutral valences in Marc Champagne, “Axiomatizing Umwelt 
Normativity,” Sign Systems Studies 39, no. 1 (2011), pp. 45–47. 
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A table of alternatives and probabilities, whatever the complexity of 
the resultant grid, is a fairly benign construction. Moreover, standard accounts 
of rational choice openly omit to discuss where the input utilities come from. 
Hence, Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser conclude that “we pick or we 
choose as the case may be; but as to our utilities or values themselves, to the 
extent they can be thought to be selected at all, they can only be picked.”30 If 
it does not matter where the agent’s elected preferences come from, I do not 
think it should create a kerfuffle to acknowledge that, once refined in 
accordance with the canons of rationality, these utilities still allow for causa 
sui actions. Endorsing a threefold menu of utilities, indifference, and will, the 
observable absence of indifference no longer licenses the inference of tacit 
utilities.
31
 
 
                                                          
30 Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser, “Picking and Choosing,” p. 783. 
 
31 I would like to thank Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Mathieu Doucet, Susan Dimock, and 
audience members at the 2012 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association for 
feedback on an earlier version of this article. 
 
